Labour
Law Reforms: Shift from Labour Market to Industrial Relations is the Key!
K.R.
Shyam Sundar
Violence-laced industrial conflicts and long,
sustained and costly industrial conflicts have taken place in the 2000s as they
did in the 1970s and the 1980s primarily on the trade union recognition issue,
though the complementary labour flexibility strategies followed by the
employers in the post-reform period has been additionally responsible for the
conflicts.
Consequent to reforms relating to the product market
both domestically and on the external front since 1991 the industry leaders and
others have been loudly and insistently clamouring for reforms of certain
clauses of labour laws (core labour law reforms) and of the labour governance
system. They demand labour flexibility
in terms of freedom to hire contract labour without the fear of prohibition,
retrench workers and close down undertakings without the compulsion of prior
government endorsement and enjoy the freedom to introduce technological changes
having loss of employment implications.
Further, they want a liberal labour inspection system and a rational and
modern system of records compliance. The
employers may have a case here or there in these demands.
But there are other compelling issues which hurt
industrial relations governance at the plant level the cure of which would,
along with the aforementioned demands – granting their economic rationale for a
moment – enhance the competitiveness of the firms. One of the core issues is the absence of provisions
in the central trade union law providing for mechanism for determination of
collective bargaining agent, resolution of intra-union disputes by labour
judiciary and allied aspects such as unfair labour practices as they do in some
state labour laws like in Maharashtra. These
measures would surely pre-empt and prevent the incidence of a significant share
of the industrial conflicts and provide a basis for building sound industrial
relations governance. The labour
flexibility and governance issues have disproportionately dominated the debates
on the labour law reforms and this issue has not been mentioned in them.
In the given legal context, the multiple unions
fight for recognition by the employers and the inter-union rivalries vitiate
the industrial relations at the workplace.
Even if an employer wishes to negotiate with the trade union, in a
multiple trade union set-up with which union does he negotiate? What is the
basis on which the bargaining agent status be granted as several methods such
as membership verification, check-off and secret ballot compete for
attention? The trade unions are divided
over the method of determination. In the
absence of a law on union recognition even a minority union could raise
industrial disputes and affect industrial relations. The intra-union disputes especially over the
election of office-bearers are taken up for resolution in the civil court which
as is well-known lead to excessive litigation.
Even if the employer enjoys labour flexibility, these issues would lead
to worsening of the industrial relations governance and labour flexibility
often becomes counterproductive.
As archaic as any other labour law is the Trade
Unions Act, 1926 and it is of limited use unlike most labour laws. Cast in the colonial period and constructed
along the lines of the then extant British law it merely provides for voluntary
registration of trade unions, affords certain protections and regulates rather
severely the internal affairs of the trade unions. With a rather liberal eligibility condition
of seven members for formation of a trade union and given the splintered nature
of Indian society and polity, these fostered unbearable multiplicity of trade
unions resulting even in intra-union splits.
It took exactly 75 years to cure this malady! In 2001, the law was
amended to raise the eligibility conditions for formation of trade unions. The protective clauses of the law were
rendered technically superfluous once the Constitution of India assured the fundamental
right of association.
Despite the incidence of bloody industrial conflicts
in Tamil Nadu (e.g. Simpson strike, the TVS strike) and the Bombay textile
industry strike and despite the recommendations of several high profile
commissions, the Central government has remained unshaken. It has kept the central law as tepid as
possible. It blamed the trade unions for
not coming to an agreement on the choice among the competing methods of determining
the bargaining agent. The dominance of
INTUC and its political mentor, Congress’ long rule helped to sustain the
stalemate.
State level laws and voluntary code of discipline
were considered sufficient to deal with this crucial issue! Maharashtra led the show by enacting the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act [MRTU
(PULP) Act] in 1971. Several state
governments like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Kerala, Bihar have either
legislated rules or made regulations for determination of collective bargaining
agent. The long industrial conflict in
MRF Company’s plant in Tamil Nadu in 2009 over the recognition of trade union further
exposed the inadequacies in the central law on trade unions and revealed the imbalances
in the legal structure on the same subject in the country.
The absence of a national legislation providing for
determination of collective bargaining agent exposes the irrationality on the
part of the central/state governments.
The governments and others persistently cite the need to provide labour
flexibility to capital to precisely attract foreign productive investment into the
country. Labour flexibility is necessary
to manage the labour market factors efficiently. But workplace governance is even more
important as cordial labour relations are essential for productivity and
progress which can be ensured only by sound industrial relations
governance. The invite to [foreign]
capital is inadequate as there is no law on union recognition. The foreign firms complain that even if they
desire to – an ambitious thought given the recent trends! – negotiate with
trade unions they need to know with which trade union should they negotiate among
the several that crowd the negotiating table.
As industrial conflicts thanks to these inadequacies play spoilsport,
the government and others are unduly preoccupied with securing labour
flexibility as if it is the only magic wand that would ensure competitiveness
of a firm or the economy. It is another
matter that India unlike its neighbours in South Asia has not ratified the
Fundamental ILO Conventions on freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining even after 65 years of their adoption.
The dormancy on the part of employers and trade
unions on this issue is striking. Even if
the employers did not make the demand for recognition law, the trade unions
purely to make themselves attractive in these adverse times should demand legal
mechanisms to set their distraught house(s) in order.
The government, the employers and the trade unions
need to apply their minds on this crucial even basic issue of union recognition
before or along with effecting other reform measures to ensure efficient and
equitable outcomes.
K.R. Shyam Sundar
XLRI
17 September 2014
krshyams@xlri.ac.in
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